Hierarchical Complexity Scoring System (HCSS)
How to Score Anything1
Michael Lamport Commons, Harvard
Medical School; Patrice Marie Miller, Harvard Medical School; Eric Andrew
Goodheart, Harvard University; Dorothy Danaher-Gilpin
Commons, M. L., Miller, P. M.,
Goodheart, E. A., & Danaher-Gilpin, D. (2005). Hierarchical Complexity Scoring System
(HCSS): How to Score Anything. Unpublished Scoring Manual Available from
Dare Institute, Commons@tiac.net
© 1991-2005 Dare Association,
Inc. Cambridge, MA 02138
Abstract
The Model of Hierarchical Complexity presents a
framework for scoring reasoning stages in any domain as well as in any cross
cultural setting. The scoring is based
not upon the content or the participant material, but instead on the
mathematical complexity of hierarchical organization of information. The
participant’s performance on a task of a given complexity represents the stage
of developmental complexity. This paper presents an elaboration of the concepts
underlying the Model of Hierarchical Complexity (MHC), the description of the
stages, steps involved in universal stage transition, as well as examples of
several scoring samples using the MHC as a scoring aid.
Introduction
The Basis of Scoring Performance and Constructing
Tasks: The Issues
The
assessment of stage of development would seem like a straight forward
task. One might look at the resposes to
questions and place them into categories.
Likewise one might construct questions to obtain responses that succeed
or fail in addressing that item. But the
issue is not so simple. These previous
ways have led to great difficulties and endless controversies.
There are
three prerequisites. First, one needs to
understand the difference among experience, appearance, and reality. Second, one needs to understand the
difference among Analysis, Phenomenology and Empiricism. And third and last is to understand the
difference between independent and dependent variables as set forth by
Aristotle and modified by Descartes into stimulus and response.
History
The
following is adapted from Edger Brown (2004). It is
important that any "stage" theory and the accompanying scoring scheme have a mathematically and logically
developed basis. The Greek philosopher
and scientist, Thales (640 - 546) of Miletus, who had knowledge of
Egyptian geometry and Babylonian astronomy, is credited with founding
mathematics as a deductive science, that is, organizing mathematics around
demonstrating by logical arguments the correctness of one’s assertions and
calculations.
But if one
does not understand the difference between the ideal and the real one can get
into trouble. The failure of the
Pythagorean school rested with its need to make its assertions absolute. How could one conduct science or have
knowledge in general without the possibility that this knowledge corresponds
with reality? Plato handled this problem
by rejecting the correspondence account of truth. We cannot ever know the truth in its complete
and pure form. Anything we can say about
reality is only a likely story of the ideal truth. Here the ideal truth is the mathematical
forms.
We know
that an essential element of science is direct observation and interaction with the world. But, Plato set forth a very different
doctrine, to the effect that knowledge cannot be derived from the senses; real
knowledge only
has to do with concepts. The senses only deceive us;
hence we should, in acquiring knowledge, ignore sense impressions and develop
reason.
Aristotle
(384-322), in codifying logical reasoning, set down rules of inference and
recognized the importance of axioms for logic, postulates for the subject at
hand, definitions of terms and the importance of giving logical arguments
starting with the postulates. The model
of hierarchical complexity follows in that tradition. Combining of Aristotle's
precise formulation of logic with Thales' method, the main elements of modern
science were then in place
The Model
of Hierarchical Complexity on which scoring and problem construction is based,
is a mathematical theory of the ideal.
It is a perfect form as Plato would have described. It is like a circle. Once one draws it, it is no longer
perfect. The lines have width, it is not
perfect. If can be be perfectly round.
Events
Scientific
accounts of behavior are built out of both analytical and empirical accounts of
events. One problem that continually
arises is what perturbations to consider as existing, or in other words, what
constitutes an event. There only seems
to be one necessary restriction on saying that something exists. The restriction is rather weak compared to
those required by operationalism but strong with respect to intuitionism and
phenomenonology. With the quantitative
behavioral developmental theory that follows, we have to consider events as the
basis. This notion is less restrictive
than behaviorists' notions of stimuli and responses and so allows the theory to
consider events that may not be clearly stimuli or responses. On the other hand, we do not want to make the
mistake of Piagetians that thoughts,
"schema," and verbalizations that belong to mental structures are the
only causes of actions.
How do we
know that something is an event? Events
are potentially detectable perturbations.
Perturbations are classed as events when they achieve some potential to
be observed, witnessed, and in some way distinguished from the remaining noise
by two independent paths of detection.
The term event is used here to include all such perturbations, both
public and private. The notion of paths
of detection is not deniable or reducible lest we get into an infinite
regress. These paths do not require
direct observation. Note also that more
experiencers or more experiences do not count as more independent paths.
Potential
events may be inferred as long as there are two distinct paths leading to that
inference, such as the case with electrons. Electrons may be detected through a
multitude of paths by which inferences as to the existence of an "electron
event" can be made. One can measure
the magnetic moment of a single electron moving along a path in a magnetic
field, the electric charge in an electric field, or the ionizing potential in a
liquid hydrogen bubble chamber. There
are numerous other ways of detecting the electron.
The reason
two paths are required for events is because one path alone could mean that the
perturbation could serve as its own causal explanation of itself. Some perturbations are deemed as having the
status of being only singly detectable by one path. For example, if someone reports that the
president is talking to them, there is one path, their report. They do not have a radio, telephone or any
other such device and the president is nowhere close by. One other path is necessary to confirm that
the president is actually talking to them and they are not reporting a
hallucination. Behaviors and causes
detected from a personal experience alone have this character. Robert Stickgold (personal communication,
1999) has shown that people think that of what they think, see, and dream as
"real" while thinking, seeing and dreaming. The status of events and perturbations is
even more complex when activity is not potentially observable, as is with
gyrations of the soul or will. These
perturbations may be studied in theological and theosophical terms ( Lowenthal, 1989).
The best we can do within science is to discuss the report of these
perturbations as data to be explained or refer to these perturbations in
metaphorical terms.
Behavioral
constructs (such as stimuli, behaviors, or consequences) are events. In the case of a verbal report, an observer
may hear it. A microphone and meter will
show it. There is a difference between the appearance of a perceived event and
the actual event. Perceptual activity
can transform events. Illusions refer to
those instances where people report the appearance of stimuli in ways that
distort the physical properties of the objects or events. Let us say one was looking at a color patch
and the person said, "I see the color brown." But the color brown has
no unique
Three Ways of Knowing about Development
With the
definitions of perturbations and events, it is possible to show what are the
minimum conditions necessary for having a quantitative behavioral developmental
theory. One needs to recognize the
different ways in which we might know and understand development. The argument is very simple. There are three
ways of knowing:
Three Ways of Knowing about Development
With the definitions of perturbations and events, it is possible to show what are the minimum conditions necessary for having a quantitative behavioral developmental theory. One needs to recognize the different ways in which